USA

Reoccurrence of Chinese stowaways

Towards the end of May 2004, two entered vessels, a container and bulk carrier arrived at Long Beach, California and Vancouver, Canada respectively. Each had sailed from Busan, Korea, around the middle of May, one from the main container terminal and the second from Pier 5, bulk cargo, which is adjacent to the terminal.

During the voyage to Long Beach on the container vessel, three Chinese stowaways, all originating from Fujian, were found hiding in the deck container stack area. There was no evidence of any crew involvement in secreting the stowaways aboard and it was suspected that they had gained access during the vessel's stay in Busan.

In the case of the bulk carrier, seven Fujianese stowaways were discovered hiding in a void space below the forecastle and above the fore peak tank. In this case, they alleged that crew had assisted them to gain access to the vessel.

During the course of investigations it transpired that a third non-club entered vessel had also been found in Long Beach to have four Fujianese stowaways aboard, again hiding in above-deck container stacks.

In this instance, no evidence was present that the crew had assisted them and similarly the vessel had sailed from Busan during the same period.

From enquiries and debriefing of the stowaways, it appears that Korean Nationals in Busan provided help and, in some cases, the stowaways had been housed in Busan pending the discovery of a suitable vessel.

Fortunately, there is no suggestion that the stowaways had gained entry to containers and the most likely explanation is that they boarded the vessel at a time when the gangway was unattended. Certainly in respect of the non-club related incident, four Chinese were allowed onboard the vessel in the company of two Korean Nationals, who alleged that they were from owners. No evidence existed of them having left the vessel.

It is obviously important that owners and operators provide training and adequate supervision to those crew members responsible for vessel security in ports, although within increasing numbers of crew members, providing adequate cover becomes increasingly difficult.

If crew are not adequate to cater for this obligation, then consideration should be given to recruiting a security officer to supplement vessel security whilst in port. Certainly, Members should afford renewed attention whenever vessels are calling at this terminal.